

JOINT STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT TEAM






**SIGIR Leadership
14 May 2007**

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Situation - General




Nature of the Conflict –

- ***Communal struggle for power and survival*** between rival political, ethnic and sectarian groups;
- ***Insurgency*** against the central government and the coalition continues and sets conditions for terrorism and sectarian conflict
- 1.4c, 1.4d
- Underlying and contributing to instability is a ***chronic lack of state capacity*** to fulfill basic responsibilities to its people

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Situation – Obstacles to Progress



- Continued sectarian behavior
- A large number of Gol actions are inconsistent with and undermine coalition objectives
- Coalition, to date, has not exerted sufficient leverage to dictate Gol behavior or impose will on parties to the conflict
- We are running out of time
- Many Iraqi communities and organizations are positioning themselves for future conflict rather than endeavoring to achieve stability through power sharing
- Coalition organization and inadequate Gol capacity

We need more *leverage* and more *time*

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Recommended Joint Campaign Plan Goals

Near-Term (6 to 9 months): End large scale sectarian violence and defeat AQI/insurgency such that economic and political development can proceed; conditions set for substantial progress on political accommodation and for maintaining improved security while coalition forces are slowly reduced.


Intermediate (9 to 21 months): The establishment of a negotiated political agreement that leads to sustainable security.

Long-Term (multiple years): Iraq at peace with its neighbors and an ally in the War on Terror, with a representative government that respects the human rights of all Iraqis, and security forces sufficient to maintain domestic order and to deny Iraq as a safe haven for terrorists.

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Key Objectives (1 of 4)

- Forge and **maintain unity of effort** within the Coalition and between the Coalition, the Government of Iraq, and Iraqi Security Forces.
- **Shape the regional security and international political dimensions** of the effort to achieve sustainable stability; undertake or recommend the appropriate coalition and Iraqi diplomatic and military actions to advance our efforts, grow international support, and reduce or interdict disruptive and destabilizing influences.
- Generate and apply persuasive, cooperative, and coercive means to **move reconcilable groups toward compromise and into the political process**, defeat irreconcilables, dramatically reduce ethno-sectarian violence and create the conditions that allow Iraqis to reach a national political accommodation that leads to enduring stability and development.

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Key Objectives (2 of 4)

- Conduct effective multi-national (coalition-Gol) **counterinsurgency and counter-terrorist operations** to protect the population, isolate extremists, destroy terrorists organizations, address local grievances, rekindle hope among the people, and set conditions for political compromise.
- Work with Iraqi leadership to **remove disruptive actors** from the government and security forces, marginalize destabilizing influences and **strengthen responsible individuals** who can help move Iraq toward political accommodation.
- **Reform, strengthen, and expand Iraqi security institutions** such that they are able to sustain the security situation after Coalition forces are reduced and the population regards their forces as professional and legitimate.

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Key Objectives (3 of 4)

- Assist the Iraqi government in **providing basic services** for the population while building and connecting governance capacity at the national, provincial, and district levels such that the Gol functions without coalition assistance and in a way that does not disadvantage particular communities.
- Assist the Gol in **building Rule of Law capacity** to curtail extrajudicial actions, ensure that there are consequences for criminal activity, adopt a degree of due process consistent with the security situation, and meet humanitarian standards.
- Assist the Gol in **setting conditions for economic growth** and development while using development aid to encourage institutional reform and reward non-sectarian practices.

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Key Objectives (4 of 4)






- Develop a **long term security agreement** with the GoI and plan for coalition support such that Iraq remains secure from the transition external threats and is able to continue to develop politically and economically.
- Assist the GoI in developing and **implementing a program to disarm, de-mobilize, and re-integrate** militias and illegal armed groups back into mainstream society.
- Conduct effective **strategic communication to clarify coalition intentions**, counter enemy disinformation, expose enemy brutality and nefarious objectives of both the enemy 1.4c, 1.4d
1.4c, 1.4d and move Iraq's communities toward compromise and reconciliation.

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Concept



- Apply integrated civil-military leverage to drive key Iraqi internal political actors towards political accommodation
- Remove malign actors and reduce destructive sectarian bias in government
- Secure necessary authorities in context of discussions concerning long term security agreements.
- Streamline and network coalition organizations; build ministerial capacity, generate performance, and connect the "center" to provinces and districts
- Prioritize security efforts to Baghdad and the "Baghdad belts" then to mixed sectarian and mixed ethnicity areas
- Create a security environment in which a much larger, reformed, capable and professional ISF can retain control, with the populace cooperating with the ISF to sustain security.
- Focus economic development aid on achievable goals the attainment of which will make a maximum contribution to achieving sustainable stability.

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Key Differences from previous JCP/JCAP

- Realistic goals within JCP timeframe
- Political accord as driver for other efforts
- Stress on population security as critical to success
- Call for more active CF role in setting limits on parties
- Recognition that GoI itself is part of sectarian problem
- Call for focusing economic assistance relative to objectives
- Focus on external dimension of Iraq's problems

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Risks

- Lack of time; erosion of coalition will; enemies wait us out
- Loss of necessary authorities
- Insufficient forces to protect population and break cycle of sectarian violence; extremists prevent progress
- Iraqi fears/desire for revenge exceed desire to co-exist
- 1.4c, 1.4d
- GOI/ISF non cooperation, sovereign intransigence
- GOI/ISF learning curve too shallow; reforms inadequate

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Questions?

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